## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/SE:NCLEDSKY:VSS APPROVED BY C:MNIMETZ EUR:REB S/S:SGOLDSMITH S:DSPIEGEL

-----050145Z 006437 /72-61

O 050025Z MAY 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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**EXDIS** 

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, TU

SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY

1. TURKISH AMBASSADOR ESENBEL CALLED ON THE SECRETARY MAY 4 UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO COMPLAIN ABOUT ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON TURKISH-US SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. ESENBEL SAID HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM ANKARA WHERE HE HAD LENGTHY CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL. DEMIREL HAD ASKED HIM TO SEE THE SECRETARY TO EMPHASIZE THAT US DECISION TO ENDORSE TURKISH-US DCA IN PRINCIPLE WAS NOT SATISFACTORY. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD LONG SOUGHT TO CONTAIN ANTI-AMERICANISM AND TO KEEP ALIVE US-TURKISH FRIENDSHIP AND DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO CONFIDENTIAL

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COUNTRIES WITHIN NATO. THIS POSTURE WAS INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR TURKEY TO MAINTAIN, AND THE US DECISION NOT TO URGE IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON TURKISH-US DCA WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE. DEMIREL SAID HE BELIEVED US ENDORSEMENT, IN PRINCIPLE, MUST BE FOLLOWED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BY ACTION IN THE CONGRESS. ESENBEL SAID THAT DEMIREL WOULD TAKE SAME APPROACH WHEN HE MEETS PRESIDENT

IN LONDON ON MAY 10.

2. ESENBEL ALSO EXPRESSED UNHAPPINESS, ON PERSONAL BASIS, WITH ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO MOVE AGGRESSIVELY TO HAVE

CONGRESS LIFT FMS EMBARGO ON SALES TO TURKEY. CLIFFORD RECOMMENDATIONS HAD BEEN REDUCED TO EXEMPTION FOR F-4'S, AND EVEN THIS MODEST STEP WAS BEING UNDERMINED IN CONGRESS BY FAILURE OF STATE DEPT TO SPEAK OUT FORCEFULLY. ESENBEL SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO BOTH CONGRESSMEN HAMILTON AND ZABLOCKI WHO FELT THAT CONGRESS WOULD LIFT FMS EMBARGO IF ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY SUPPORTED SUCH A STEP.

- 3. SECRETARY AND COUNSELOR NIMETZ RECALLED TO ESENBEL THAT BEGINNING WITH VISIT TO ANKARA OF CLARK CLIFFORD IN FEBRUARY, ADMINISTRATION HAD NEVER INDICATED THAT IT COULD DO MORE INITIALLY THAN ENDORSE DCA IN PRINCIPLE. FURTHER ACTION CLEARLY DEPENDED ON MOVEMENT ON CYPRUS, AND IN THIS AREA THE SECRETARY AGAIN EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH RECENT TURKISH PERFORMANCE IN VIENNA.
- 4. ESENBEL INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT WHILE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE OF US POSITION, HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO INDICATE TURKISH UNHAPPINESS WITH FAILURE OF ADMINISTRATION TO MOVE FOR EARLY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON DCA AND TO EXPLAIN THAT ENDORSEMENT IN PRINCIPLE OF THIS DOCUMENT MEANS VERY LITTLE TO TURKEY.
- 5. CONVERSATION THEN SHIFTED TO CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION CONFIDENTIAL

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WITH RESPECT TO F-4'S. SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT ADMINISTRATION STOOD BY POSITION OUTLINED BY COUNSELOR NIMETZ TO HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE TWO WEEKS AGO, BUT THAT CONGRESS "WORKS ITS OWN WILL" AND THAT FURTHER CHANGES ON THE HILL MIGHT BE MADE IN TURKISH PACKAGE. NIMETZ EMPHASIZED THAT IMPORTANT THING WASNOT TO LOOK AT DAILY ZIGS AND ZAGS OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, BUT TO LONG-TERM US-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP WHICH ADMINISTRATION WAS WORKING TO STABILIZE AND STRENGTHEN. WE WERE COMMITTED TO THIS GOAL. ADMINISTRATION ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTED F-4 PROGRAM, AND WOULD WORK WITH TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO FIND MEANS FOR CARRYING IT FORWARD.

- 6. THE CONVERSATION CLOSED WITH SECRETARY INDICATING THAT HE AND PRESIDENT WERE LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING WITH TURKISH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER IN LONDON.
- 7. FOR ANKARA. IN EXPLAINING F-4 SITUATION TO TURKISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, EMBASSY MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING

## POINTS:

A. CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN GENERAL CONTINUE TO BE NEGATIVE. HOUSE AND SENATE ALTERED AND CUT BACK ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS FOR SECURITY

ASSISTANCE IN MANY AREAS. FUNDS FOR KOREA, ZAIRE, AND FOR OTHER SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WERE ELIMINATED OR CURTAILED. TURKEY WAS NOT IN ANY SENSE SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL ADVERSE TREATMENT BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

B. IT WAS OUR BEST ESTIMATE THAT THE ENTIRE TURKISH AID PACKAGE AS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS COULD NOT BE PASSED. RATHER THAN RUN THE RISK OF DEFEAT WHICH WOULD NOT LOOK GOOD IN TURKEY AND WHICH MIGHT HAVE SET BACK OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO STEADILY IMPROVE OUR RELATIONSHIP, THE ADMINISTRATION DECIDED NOT TO MAKE A MAJOR BATTLE ON THE F-4 CONFIDENTIAL

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ISSUE AS IT WAS THE ELEMENT MOST LIKELY TO AROUSE CONTROVERSY.

C. EVEN TURKEY'S STAUNCHEST FRIENDS IN CONGRESS NEVER HAVE UNDERSTOOD WHY A LEGISLATIVE BATTLE HAD TO BE FOUGHT OVER THE F-4 PROGRAM WHEN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT COULD OBTAIN THE ARICRAFT IT DESIRED THROUGH A COMMERCIAL CONTRACT. THE F-4 PROBLEM WAS ALSO EXTREMELY TECHNICAL AND DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN IN A LEGISLATIVE SETTING. IT SEEMED PREFERABLE NOT TO RISK A FIGHT OVER TURKISH AID ON A TECHNICAL RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE.

D. THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONVINCED OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THE US-TURKISH SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. ITS ENDORSEMENT OF THE DCA IN PRINCIPLE, ITS REQUEST FOR DOLS 175 MILLION IN FMS AUTHORITY FOR FY 78 IS PROOF OF THIS, AS IS OUR DETERMINATION TO WORK TOWARD A STEADY GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF US-TURKISH RELATIONS.

E. THE ADMINISTRATION IS ALSO COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING THE F-4 MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES. MOREOVER, AFTER THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS MANY IN CONGRESS NOW APPRECIATE TURKEY'S F-4 REQUIREMENT. WE STAND READY TO EXPLORE WITH TURKISH AUTHORITIES WAYS TO KEEP THE PROGRAM GOING, WITH AS MUCH OF IT UNDER FMS AS POSSIBLE, AND WE ARE HOPEFUL ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CONGRESS WILL BE SUPPORTIVE OF SUCH A NON-LEGISLATIVE MIXED FMS/COMMERCIAL SOLUTION.

8. PARAS 1 THROUGH 6 ABOVE BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON AND ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE. VANCE

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## Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z

Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am Channel Indicators: n/a

**Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED** 

Concepts: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SECURITY, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AMBASSADORS

Control Number: n/a

Copy: SINGLE Sent Date: 05-May-1977 12:00:00 am Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW

Disposition Date: 22 May 2009 Disposition Event: Disposition Event:
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE102129
Document Source: Core

**Document Unique ID: 00 Drafter:** NCLEDSKY:VSS Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS

Errors: N/A **Expiration:** 

Film Number: D770157-0275

Format: TEL From: STATE **Handling Restrictions:** 

Image Path:

ISecure: 1

Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770589/aaaaczcx.tel

Line Count: 170 Litigation Code IDs: Litigation Codes:

Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

Message ID: 8467179a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS

Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS

Reference: n/a Retention: 0

Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Content Flags: Review Date: 03-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am

Review Event: Review Exemptions: n/a **Review Media Identifier:** Review Release Date: n/a

Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

SAS ID: 2627489 Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: TURKISH AMBASSADOR\'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY

TAGS: PFOR, TU To: ANKARA Type: TE

vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/8467179a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Review Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009